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Abstract In this paper we use new venture creation in Indian family firms to explore
the family firm as an inter-institutional system. We argue that in societies where the
traditional family dominates social and economic life, the relationship between the two
institutions, the firm and the family, is managed via inter-institutional logics. These
inter-institutional logics help reconcile the tensions that often arise in the family firms
during strategic decision making. We use archival and interview data on 36 new
ventures in eight Indian family firms to identify these logics. Our analysis
shows that the interaction between firm and family institutional logics in
Indian family firms generates four sub-logics: economic, expertise, reputation
and attachment. These four logics are used to frame and screen new venture
opportunities and justify resource allocation.
Key words Family firms . Family values . New venture creation . Emergingmarkets .
Inter-institutional system
The evolution of family firms in traditional societies is influenced by the key strategic
decisions that members of the family make, both in their capacity as owners who must
protect the long-term interests of the family, and in their capacity as decision makers
who must guide the growth of the firm. Broadly speaking, there are two views of how
family firm evolution shapes this interaction. The first, which is often labeled the
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Bconvergence^ thesis (Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009), argues that social change and
economic development in emerging economies leads to a structural separation between
the family and the firm that we observe in more mature economies. Thus, we should
expect this separation to result in family members exercising influence on strategy
through membership on the board, while an executive team composed of professional
managers formulate and execute strategy within the firm. The second perspective on
the same issue is rooted in the so called Bvarieties of capitalism^ perspective (Carney,
Gedajlovic, & Yang, 2009; Hall & Soskice, 2001). This perspective rejects the inev-
itable separation of decision-making powers between family and management pro-
posed by the convergence thesis, and argues instead that strategic decision making in
traditional family firms is shaped by an intimate, and ongoing, interaction between the
family as an institution that is embedded in the local sociocultural environment, and the
firm as an institution that responds to market imperatives that are national or even
international (Alesina & Giuliano, 2015).
An institutional, or more precisely inter-institutional, perspective that adopts a
varieties of capitalism perspective on the dual role that the family occupies in a
traditional family firm raises the question that we wish to address in this paper: How
does the family in a traditional society make strategic decisions while at the same time
meeting the norms and expectations that are intrinsic to the family as an institution and
the firm as an institution? The theoretical perspective that we use to answer this
question is the general theory of inter-institutional systems as originally formulated
by Friedland and Alford (1991), and further developed by Leaptrott (2005),
Greenwood, Diaz, Xiao Li, and Lorente (2010), and Miller, Le Breton-Miller, and
Lester (2011). Our empirical approach is to focus on a single type of strategic decision:
the launch of new ventures. This, we believe, will allow us to compare with greater
precision how interaction between family and firm logics in the Indian family firm
influences strategic decision making by looking at new venture creation in the family
firm.
The empirical setting we use to explore the predictions of inter-institutional systems
is strategic decision making by Indian family firms. We use multiple case research
design (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009), specifically
looking at new ventures created by family businesses that are listed on the Indian
Stock Exchange. Our focus is on examining logics which influence decision to allocate
or not to allocate resources to a new venture based on the case that family members
make for the venture.
Our analysis of this data suggests that new venture creation is shaped by four sub-logics
that emerge from the interaction of family and firm institutional logics: economic, expertise,
reputation and attachment (abbreviated as EERA in this paper). More specifically, we show
that family EERA logic guides how the family interprets the economic contribution and
financial risks of new venture opportunities. Secondwe point out that EERA logicwill focus
attention on the contribution that new venture opportunities can make to developing
entrepreneurial talent and improving managerial expertise among the family members.
Third, we show that EERA logic leads family decision makers to examine the reputational
risks and benefits of potential new venture opportunities before lending their support.
Finally, we show that family decision makers will view new venture opportunities through
the lens of inter-generational cohesion, lending their support to new ventures if they increase
attachment and commitment of younger family members to the family business.
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Our research draws on, and makes a contribution to, two research streams. The first,
and most immediate contribution, is to the emerging research stream on institutional
logics, in particular literature that looks at the family’s role as a nonmarket institution
with its own institutional logic (i.e., firm is organized to serve family members)
(Greenwood et al., 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013; Reay, Jaskiewicz, &
Hinings, 2015; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). The second, and more general
contribution, is to the literature on entrepreneurship within family firms (Cruz,
Howorth, & Hamilton, 2013; Schjoedt, Monsen, Pearson, Barnett, & Chrisman,
2013; Steier, Chua, & Chrisman, 2009). Here, we make a contribution to research on
entrepreneurship processes by, and within, family firms. Most current research on this
area tends to focus on how family firms evaluate the economic aspects of new venture
creation, with particular attention to transgenerational entrepreneurship, and the pres-
ervation of inter-generational wealth (Zellweger, Nason, & Nordqvist, 2012). Our study
broadens the criteria used to evaluate new ventures, thus throwing new light on
entrepreneurship in family firms that operate in traditional societies.
Our research also has practical implications. Often family members and non-family
managers involved in new venture projects, including their sponsors, do not have a
clear idea about the relative importance of family logic or the multiple dimensions of
family logic. In the absence of clearly discussed and accepted criteria, families are more
likely to take sub-optimal decisions or may delay decisions to the detriment of the
family and the firm. We highlight that attention to family EERA logic enables family
firms to plan and execute new venture opportunities more successfully while attending
to the family’s and firm’s needs. For instance, family firms may be able to adjust the
weight assigned to each of the four dimensions of family logics, such as expertise or
attachment, during key events such as arrival of the next generation in the family
business or the decision by a family member to pursue a new venture opportunity
outside the core business.
Theoretical foundation
Family firm as an inter-institutional system
Scott (2014: vii) pointed out that crafting a definition of institutions that is inclusive and
rigorous is difficult (see also Alesina & Giuliano, 2015: 902). For the purposes of our
paper we use two definitions of institutions, the first is general, and the second is more
specific. Hodgson (2006: 18) defined institutions as Bsystems of established and
embedded social rules that structure social interactions.^ In our case, we need
to focus on organizations. Here it is useful to cite Lopez and Scott’s (2000: 3)
definition of institutional structure as Bcultural or normative patterns that define
the expectations that agents hold about each other’s behavior and that organize
enduring relations with each other.^
Institutions give rise to institutional logics. Thornton and Ocasio (1999: 804) defined
institutional logics as Bthe socially constructed historical patterns of material practices,
assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce
their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to social
reality.^ Institutional logics are used as a conceptual building block for understanding
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how organizations rooted in multiple institutions manage the inevitable tensions that
arise between the core institutional sectors of society—the family, the state, the
corporation, the professions, and the market (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Research on
institutional logics has flourished over the last decade, but until recently most of this
research focused on how some institutional logics lose their power whereas others
become dominant, and how this dominance shapes managerial practices (Thornton
et al., 2012). The basic premise of this research is that multiple institutional logics
cannot co-exist indefinitely without one marginalizing the other as organizational fields
evolve. For example, Thornton (2004) showed how structural change in the US
publishing industry led to the increasing dominance of market institutional logic at
the expense of editorial institutional logic. Haveman, Rao, and Paruchuri (2007)
showed how the influence of the progressive movement on the California thrift industry
led to the replacement of institutional logic based on direct social ties by an institutional
logic based on impersonal bureaucratic coordination. Ahlstrom, Young, Nair, and Law
(2003) examined the challenges faced by foreign firms in China and highlighted the
importance of managing the competing institutional logics in an informal institutional
environmental setting (see also Hitt, Li, & Xu, 2016). Finally, Zajac and Westphal
(1994) showed how institutional logic that derives its legitimacy from agency theory
competed with institutional logic that is based on CEO autonomy, with the former in
ascendancy until 1980, and the latter making a comeback later on.
By contrast, current research on institutional logics is increasingly focusing
on situations where multiple institutional logics not only co-exist, but also often
intermingle. For example, Lounsbury (2007) showed how trustee and
performance logics in the mutual funds industry interact to produce variation
in how mutual funds establish contracts with professional money management.
Similarly, Delmestri and Walgenbach (2009) concluded that variations in
British, French, German, Italian, UK, and US adoption of Assessment Centers
can be traced to Binterference^ between two institutional logics, the first based
on national business system, and the second derived from the human resource
profession. Kostova and Roth (2002) explored the interaction of multiple
institutional logics under conditions of Binstitutional duality^ specifically the
interaction of local institutional logic, and relational institutional logic in
multinational corporations. Finally, Battilana and Dorado (2010) saw the emer-
gence of commercial microfinance organizations as a hybrid of Bdevelopment
logic,^ the microfinance mission to help the poor, and Bbanking logic^ that
mandates profits as a fundamental requirement for creating sustainable lending
operations.
Studies of family firms have been late to recognize the usefulness of multiple logics
as an explanatory framework. A dual institutional interpretation of family firms would
suggest that they straddle two distinct institutions, the family and the firm (Leaptrott,
2005). More precisely, to use the term originally employed by Friedland and Alford
(1991), the Bfamily firm^ is an Binter-institutional system.^ In inter-institutional sys-
tems, as Thornton and Ocasio (2008: 105) pointed out, Bkey constructs in the analysis
of organization, such as efficiency, rationality, participation, and values are not neutral,
but are themselves shaped by the logics of inter-institutional system.^ In the case of
family firms, the logic of the inter-institutional system must therefore combine
two distinct institutional logics. The first is a logic that is rooted in family
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dynamics and arises from genealogical history, blood relations, marital affilia-
tions, and cultural ideologies, and the second is a logic that is shaped by the
firm’s obligations to shareholders.
Institutional logics direct attention and shape interpretations. They are, in the words
of Biggart and Guillén (1999: 725): Bsense-making constructs expressed as
conventionalized understanding of what is appropriate, normal, and reasonable.^ But
precisely because institutional logics define what is legitimate, they also provide actors
with a set of Bjustifying practices^ which they can use to appeal for resources and
support (Tilly, 2006).
Within the family, as Sillars (1995: 377) pointed out, requests for resources and
support are justified by appeals to Bcollectivist values such as sharing, cooperation,
unity, loyalty, respect, and restraint, as well as behavioral norms pertaining to mutual
assistance, family obligations, subordination of individual needs to family
needs, and preservation of family honor or dignity.^ In contrast, within the
firm appeals for resources and support are justified by reference to market
opportunities and financial returns.
A family firm as an inter-institutional system therefore faces the challenge of
balancing the collectivist orientation of the family with the market and financial
orientation of the firm. Research suggests that family firms in Western econo-
mies where rapid industrial and social change took place simultaneously had
difficulties discovering or sustaining this balance. For example, Ingram and
Lifschitz’s (2006) study of family firms in the Scottish shipbuilding industry
shows that Brelationship-based capitalism^ did not survive because of the
inherent tension between capitalism based on family relationships and the logic
of shareholder capitalism (taken from Greenwood et al., 2010: 527; see also
Franks, Mayer, & Rossi, 2005). In the struggle between family and firm logics,
the latter came to dominate at the expense of the former. Dispersion of
shareholding among family members over successive generations played an
important role in accelerating the process. As shareholding expands beyond
the nuclear family emotional bonds that play a role in decision making recede
in importance (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2013; Rau, 2013).
Research suggests that family decision makers are usually concerned with main-
taining what Gomez-Mejia, Makri, and Kintana (2010: 223) referred to as the family’s
socioemotional endowment: the Bfamily’s ability to exercise authority, the enjoyment of
personal control, ‘clan membership,’ a sense of belonging, affection, and intimacy, as
well as an active role in the family dynasty.^ Preserving socioemotional endowment is
a preoccupation in all family firms (Labaki, Michael-Tsabari, & Zachary, 2013;
Leitterstorf & Rau, 2014), but it tends to be particularly strong in family firms
that operate in traditional societies where the extended family not only shapes
individual identity but also holds sway over their adult lives. In these societies,
to quote Sharma and Manikutty (2005: 301), Bleaders are viewed as stewards of
the family business and are more likely to feel the pressure to act in concert
with the wishes of the family collective.^
Families in traditional societies are therefore more likely to reinforce the role
of family logic in the business by cultivating identification with the business
among the younger generation from early age. Family patriarchs in such
societies are also more likely to prefer arranged marriages for their children
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based on the needs of the family business (Mehrotra, Morck, Shim, &
Wiwattanakantang, 2011). Such marriages are often used to expand family
influence by forming familial bonds with important families or individuals,
but they also serve to reduce the family vulnerability to inter-generational loss
of interest by core members by bringing in new family members that are
potentially interested in working in the family firm. To quote Mehrotra et al.
(2011: 1124), Barranged marriages might bring in highly capable sons-in-laws
(or daughters-in-law) who can take management roles in the family business; or
sons-and daughters-in laws thought better able to foster talent in their children.^
In this paper we argue that institutional logics exercise pervasive influence on the
management and evolution of family firms. In general, however, this influence is covert
and informal. It becomes more explicit when key strategic decisions such as
new venture formation require formal deliberation and major resource
commitment.
Exploring the tensions between firm and family logics in new venture formation
To explore the interaction between family and firm logics we decided to focus
on new venture creation. The main reason we chose new venture creation in
this instance is the relatively clear sequential decision-making process, and set
of evaluative criteria, that most studies use to describe new venture creation.
Briefly put, the literature separates the new venture creation process into three
phases: conception, screening and implementation. The conception phase com-
prises of opportunity detection and framing. The screening phase lends explicit
support to some ventures while setting aside others. Finally, once the venture
gains approval and resources are committed to implementation, it moves to-
wards becoming a new enterprise with its own organizational structure and
budget.
Research on new venture creation highlights a set of criteria that are used to
evaluate ideas and alternatives during each of these phases. During conception
managers are expected to analyze new venture opportunities in function of
Bchanges in technology, consumer preferences, or some other attributes of the
context within which a market or industry exists^ (Kirzner, 1973: 10). The key
criterion during the new venture selection phase is the expected rate of return,
usually set by top management on the basis of what they see as an acceptable
risk level. Finally, implementation calls for appointment of key personnel based
on their suitability and past experience.
In total these criteria express firm logic as it applies to new venture creation. They
are in effect normative in as much as they structure expectations of how professionally
managed firms must judge potential economic value, risk, and how they should go
about achieving the desired outcome. Our reading of the family firm literature suggests
that family internal dynamics often lead to departures from this normative logic in
many business decisions, including venture creation. Empirically, we may therefore
expect new venture creation to bring to the surface tensions between family and firm
logics that are common in other types of decisions as well. These tensions
speak to the basic difference between firm logic and family logic, which in turn
allows us to more clearly see values that frame family logic. Based on current
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literature on family firms, we would expect tensions between firm and family
logics to arise in the following areas:
Official vs. Bbehind the scenes^ decision making Firm institutional logic derives its
legitimacy from the legitimacy of firm governance. In developed economies
with strong codes of corporate conduct, maintaining the legitimacy of firm
governance calls for family members to acknowledge a separation of
decision-making powers between the board where the family is represented,
and the firm where corporate officers are authorized by their position to make
strategic decisions. In emerging economies, however, weak, or weakly enforced,
codes of corporate conduct allow family members to blur the boundaries
between the family and the firm. To some extent the blurring of the boundaries
is due to the fact that corporate officers in these family firms are frequently
also family members who unavoidably participate in family meetings where the
same issues are discussed and debated. But at a deeper level the tendency of
decision making to move back and forth between the family and the firm is due
to a culture that is comfortable with strategic decision making taking place in
family councils where the interests of the owner-family are simultaneously
considered with the needs of the company (Mustakallio, Autio, & Zahra,
2002: 208). This culture is strongly shaped by a web of formal and informal
affiliations that extends throughout the family, and beyond. These affiliative
mechanisms are reinforced by societal institutions such as weddings and reli-
gious celebrations that bring together the family, but also pay highly visible
role in the life of the community. These highly scripted events are not only
used to affirm family ties, but also used by the family to reinforce existing
networks of influence in the political establishment and the wider community
by inviting influential members of government and business leaders (Liu,
Ahlstrom, & Yeh, 2006: 419; McDonald, Khanna, & Westphal, 2008).
New venture evaluation criteria Firm institutional logic requires decision makers to
evaluate the merits of new ventures purely on the basis of the risks they pose to the
firm, and the benefits that will accrue to the firm, and indirectly to the shareholders
(without regard to whether the shares are held by the family or outside investors).
Family institutional logic, on the other hand, will support new venture creation that
increases firm wealth (since the family also benefits), but will often bring other criteria
to bear that are not legitimately part of firm logic. Specifically, firm institutional logic
will often lead decision makers to evaluate the benefits of new ventures to factors such
as inter-generational cohesion. From the point of view of family logic selecting and
resourcing a new venture as a way of reinforcing the commitment of younger family
members to the family firm is perfectly legitimate. The same is the case if new ventures
provide younger members with an opportunity to develop managerial skills.
However, from the point of view of firm institutional logic these criteria are not
legitimate, and hence officially cannot be part of the evaluation of new venture
creation. This sets up a tension between firm and family logics when evaluation
of new ventures deviates from the process mandates by firm logic. This tension
is usually managed informally through compromises and political accommoda-
tions that reinforce the influence of inter-institutional logics.
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Methodology and data
This study adopts a qualitative approach of eight case studies using interview
narratives, observations and secondary data from family firms. The general
approach of this study is Btheory elaboration^ (Eisenhardt, 1989; Lee,
Mitchell, & Sablynski, 1999; Yin, 2009). We do this by using extended case
method to guide our data analysis. This methodological approach uses empirical
data gathered through case studies to reconceptualize and extend existing theory
(Burawoy, 1991; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). The researcher explores the
literature relevant to his/her problem area, and employs the empirical case data
to fill in its gaps, reveal its flaws, elaborate its meaning, and extend its
coverage (Danneels, 2007). We drew on current research on new venture
creation, resource allocation, and family firms to develop an interview guide
(Siggelkow, 2007). The data emerged in the form of narratives that are often
used to explore how individuals view their surrounding environments (Boje,
1991). Through narratives, individuals draw on memory and current experience,
bridging the past and present (Bartel & Garud, 2009).
Data collection
Our research was based in India. The data collection involved interviews, observations,
a round-table discussion and secondary data. It was conducted over a 13-month period
from February 2009 to March 2010. We used CapEx database from the Center for
Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), which tracks new and ongoing investment
activities in India. The database allows researchers to select new units launched by
Indian family businesses. CMIE databases have been widely used by researchers
working on Indian firms (Khanna & Palepu, 2000).
From this database we selected announcements for 86 new ventures made
over the 18-month duration of the study. The new ventures were part of 22
family firms, and were not merely an expansion of existing business unit but
involved launch of new products and services. We then contacted the corporate
head offices to verify the status of new ventures, with particular focus on
whether the announcement for a new unit was actually a new venture. It is
widely known that the precise nature of most new ventures is kept off the
Bradar screen^ of publicly available records (Aldrich, 2000). For instance, some
new unit announcements turned out to be merely capacity expansion projects of
an existing manufacturing plant. We were specifically interested in ventures,
which were set-up or expected to be incorporated as a separate private firm. If
the family firm was deliberating over announcing any other new ventures in the
next six months we sought further information on the new venture. As a result,
we were only able to retain 12 family firms in our sample.
Ours was a diverse sample. The family firms had distinct family contexts. These
ranged from founder-controlled which had at least two family members active in the
business to sibling partnership to cousin-consortium where multiple family members
from different generations were involved. Studying diverse set of firms is known to
lead to firmer grounding of theory than studying a more homogeneous one (Eisenhardt
& Santos, 2009; Harris & Sutton, 1986).
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Initial approaches were made to these 12 firms using our network, and previous
research and consulting relationships. We were able to secure access into eight family
firms. In total we were able to observe 36 new ventures in various stages of develop-
ment. Out of this seven new ventures were under review during our study, and 29 new
ventures had been selected and provided resources for implementation. None of the
new ventures were yet listed entities. Table 1 includes descriptive details of the sample.
Once this initial connection was made, the family usually agreed to accommodate
further requests for research, including interviews in informal settings in family homes
or after office hours. Field data were collected by the second and third authors. In all
eight cases, after initial interviews the authors were invited to sit as observers on the
board meeting and informal family meetings where the new venture ideas and resource
allocation was discussed. In total, we conducted 19 observation sittings, where the
authors independently took handwritten notes. We also conducted 27 face-to-face semi-
structured interviews lasting from one to two hours. We interviewed at least two family
members representing the family in the board. In seven cases, we interviewed the
executive chairman, and in one case we interviewed the CEO. To further understand the
new ventures resource seeking from the parent family firm, we interviewed family and
non-family managers who had championed the new venture creation process. All
interviews were conducted in English. Almost all the interviews were tape-recorded
and transcribed, and authors made extensive notes independently during and immedi-
ately after each interview and observation sitting.
The interview with each family chairman began by introducing the research project,
and then inquiring whether the firm had launched a new venture in the recent
18 months, or was about to launch a new venture. Once this was established, we
moved to open-ended questions that dealt with how new venture opportunities are
identified, and to what extent they are related to the core business or not. We explored
the criteria the interviewees used to select each of the new ventures; the nature of
family’s and non-family managerial involvement during idea-generation stage; the
start-up budget and commitment to keep to this budget; the specific performance
objectives for the new venture. For instance, if it was required to attain a specific rate
of return or break-even after specified time-period and if there was any request for
additional resources from the new venture team as the idea matured and entered
evaluation stage. During the discussion, we probed respondents to explain the key
familial dimensions that influenced new venture creation process, and rate the impact of
these dimensions (which comprised family logic) on resource allocation from low to
moderate to high.
In the course of the interviews, family executives were asked for contact information
for new venture champions from family or non-family who might be interviewed. Next,
the new venture champions from the family and non-family were interviewed follow-
ing a similar open-ended interview process outlined above. The interviews with new
venture champions were used to corroborate information gathered from family chair-
men, but they also focused on questions such as: To what extent did the new venture
champions have autonomy in making strategic and operations decisions during the
opportunity evaluation and development stages? To what extent was the family willing
to allocate additional resources in cases where the resource requirements escalated
during the new venture creation process? At the conclusion, interviewees were asked to
share any other thoughts or information that seemed relevant.
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Table 1 Overview of family firms (not the family firm’s real names)
Family firm Launch
year
Sales (USD in
millions)
Number of
employees
Key business areas Number of business
units
Family generation
Shri Science 1986 527 6,300 Pharmaceuticals, Pharma packaging,
Clinical research
9 1st and 2nd
Founder Controlled
and
Managed
Intellect 1991 193 7,000 Engineering services, Geospatial
services, IT services
5 1st and 2nd
Founder Controlled
and
Managed
Gene Tech 1984 980 11,228 Pharmaceuticals generics, Bio-pharma,
Clinical research, New chemical entities
8 2nd
Sibling Partnership
Kohinoor
Enterprises
1965 135 3,200 Automobile parts oils, Engineering 6 2nd
Sibling Partnership
Links Limited 1990 740 8,500 Commodities, Textiles, Infrastructure 4 2nd
Sibling Partnership
Rao Corp 1900 2,400 32,000 Agriculture, Commodity consumer
durables, Engineering products &
services
29 5th
Cousin Consortium
Motilal & Sons 1923 120 3,750 Cotton trading,
Manufacturing
paints, Steel, Real
estate, Electrical
distribution,
Financial services
7 3rd
Cousin Consortium
Lohia Sons 1960 151 8,800 Rice bran oil, Food products,
Textiles, Retail
5 4th
Cousin Consortium
L
am
p
el
J.
et
al.
In addition, we gathered secondary data about the firm, the family, and new ventures
from company reports, corporate materials and information from news media, such as
press release to announce commitment of resources to a new venture being launched by
the family firm. Towards the end of the study (after the interviews and observational
data had been collected), we organized a round-table discussion around the topic: BNew
Venture Creation in Family Firms,^ which was attended by member of the top
management team from the participating family firms. One of the authors acted as a
moderator of this session. This session was video-recorded, and a transcription of the
session was prepared.
The triangulation of interview narratives, internal company documents, and
publicly available information allowed us to produce detailed descriptions for each
family firm and the new ventures. Following Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), we
took several steps to reduce the informant biases. First, the sample comprised cases
in which the new venture ideas were in the process of being discussed, and no
decision had yet been made. Second, the sample comprised cases in which new
venture opportunities were still under evaluation stage, or new ventures that were
created no more than 18 months prior to data collection. We sought to minimize
retrospective bias by collecting data from other sources such as observations,
round-table discussion, presentations, and news media. This enabled us to triangu-
late our findings to construct reliable interpretations (Yin, 2009; Zott & Huy, 2007).
Second, we interviewed highly knowledgeable informants, such as the chairman or
the new venture top managers, who were at the center of the new venture creation
process. Third, we interviewed family and non-family executives. Fourth, to en-
courage frank and open discussion we guaranteed respondents confidentiality.
Identities of all family firms, family members and new ventures are therefore
disguised in line with these assurances (Glick, Huber, Miller, Doty, & Sutcliffe,
1990). Below we provide details on the sources of the data collection for this
research (See Table 2).
Data analysis
Our data analysis involved several steps. The first analytical step involved organizing
the data on each of the family firms, identifying new ventures they had launched, and
writing detailed case narrative (Eisenhardt, 1989). We included informant quotes as
well as tables for each new venture encapsulating the key facts for each new venture to
prepare the transcript for each family firm. At this point, we also re-evaluated available
documents independently (notes from observation meetings, notes from the video-
recording of the round-table discussion, press reports, company documents) to verify
whether notes from our interviews were consistent with the content of these documents.
All interview transcripts and other relevant documents, were read repeatedly by all
three authors throughout the analysis process. The authors made notes in the margins of
the printed pages about key themes before coding these in categories such as Bnew
opportunities,^ Bmarket reasoning,^ Bfamily justification,^ Bresource allocation,^ and
Bfamily governance practices.^
We compared and discussed our coding with one another. A fourth coder, a research
assistant who was not involved in the data gathering, was used to validate our
definitions of the coding categories. She separately read through the transcripts and
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Table 2 Data sources
Family Firm Interviews Observations Round-table discussion Archival material
Number Designation Board meetings Family meetings Number
Shri Science 4 Chairman (F)
R&D Director (NF)
CFO (NF)
Business Unit Head (F)
2 1 1 Company Report
Articles
Presentations
Intellect 3 Chairman (F)
CEO (F)
Business Unit Head (NF)
1 1 1 Company Report
Articles
Presentations
Kohinoor Enterprises 2 Chairman (F)
Business Unit Head (F)
1 1 1 Company Report
Articles
Links Limited 3 Chairman (F)
Vice President (F)
Business Unit Head (NF)
1 1 1 Company Report
Business Plan
Presentations
Gene Tech 4 CEO (F)
COO (F)
Director- New Business Development (NF)
Director- Emerging Markets Group (NF)
1 1 1 Company Report
Articles
Rao Corp 3 Chairman (F)
CEO (F)
Director Strategy Planning (NF)
1 2 1 Company Report
Presentations
Motilal & Sons 3 Chairman (F)
CFO (NF)
Business Unit Head (F)
1 1 1 Company Report
Presentations
Lohia Sons 5 Chairman (F)
CEO (F)
CFO (F)
NV Directors (F)
1 2 1 Company Report
Presentations
Business Plans
F Family, NF Non-Family
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reviewed our coding, pointing inconsistent interpretations of our explanations of the
coding categories. This was used to refine and adjust the coding categories. Following
Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2009), we used the coding categories to identify themes in
the interviews (within-case analysis) and across the complete string of cases (cross-case
pattern search). Major categories and sub-categories were noted and continuously
modified with emerging evidence from primary and secondary data. We then had
another set of meetings to reach agreement on the final version of narrative of each
new venture creation process within each of the eight family firms. We shared these
case narratives with all eight family firms and followed up in person to check
if there were any discrepancies. We incorporated the input we received in the
form of additions or corrections. Following this interpretation process provided
an additional check on interpretation bias and internal validity (Boland,
Lyytinen, & Yoo, 2007; Burgelman, 2002).
The three most important categories for the analysis for each case were (1) the
characteristics of the family (whether it was a first, second or third generation firm;
emphasis placed on values such as family heritage, development of entrepreneurial
talent, and family reputation; (2) the source of new venture opportunity search; how it
developed the firm logic for the resource allocation; and (3) the role played by the
governance process-formal and relational family practices in influencing the resource
allocation decisions during the opportunity conception, screening and implementation.
Findings
New venture ideas can emerge because of Bchanges in technology, consumer prefer-
ences, or some other attributes of the context within which a market or industry exists^
(Kirzner, 1973: 10). More generally, new venture ideas may be the product of individ-
ual’s perception of market signals, willingness to experiment and learning from prior
experiments (Alvarez & Barney, 2010). But detecting new venture opportunities is very
different from persuading the rest of the organization to engage in serious discussion
about their merits, let alone obtaining the resources needed for implementation.
New venture opportunities and inter-institutional logics
Our study focuses on potential tensions between family and firm logics. We expected
these tensions to surface more explicitly when family members and non-family execu-
tives debate the relative merits of new venture opportunities. We observed that non-
family executives were much more constrained by firm logic when it came to justifying
why a particular new venture deserves serious attention. For managers, championing
new venture opportunity required legitimation in function of the firm’s current products,
technologies, or market position. More generally, managers always used criteria based
on the firm’s current strategy to champion new venture opportunities, usually by showing
how the new venture extends and reinforces the firm’s core business. A good example is
the case of Gene Tech where a new venture proposal that was championed by a non-
family executive ran into opposition from the family CEO who felt that the proposal
did not accord with family interests. Specifically, the family felt that the venture posed
strong reputational risks that could pose a problem well into the future. Our interview
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with the family CEO took place just as the process was ongoing. He described the
situation as follows:
The management team developing the Korean proposition was very passionate.
They had done lot of homework on their proposal and the return we can expect.
We have seen them working on it day and night on this proposal. Last Wednesday
they flew in a reputable Korean consultant from Seoul to give us the insights on
Korean generics market and how rapidly it is evolving. We did not interfere with
this process. It is important that non-family executives come up with new venture
proposals in the best interest of the firm. But as guardians of Krishnan family’s
interests, we have to bless the whole thing and we have clear criteria of not
entering markets where the family’s credibility and long-term interests could be in
jeopardy. When your family’s name is associated with the business, you cannot
take a gamble and we will only enter a new market when we are absolutely sure.
We owe it to next generation of Krishnan’s which is getting ready.
The above statement was unusual in its bluntness. In most of the interviews, family
members who were also executives were more reserved when it came to using family
logic to justify decisions. In some cases, family members championed new venture
opportunities using firm rather than family logic. This tended to occur when family and
firm logics were consistent with each other as far as the economic advantages of the
new ventures were concerned, and did not conflict in other areas such as intergenera-
tional cohesion or family reputation. Clearly, from the point of view of legitimizing the
decision, family executives preferred firm logic when dealing with new venture
opportunities in their managerial capacity unless tensions between the two logics stood
in the way.
Generally speaking, family members found it advantageous to use family logic
when legitimizing new ventures, and non-family executives preferred firm logic.
Family executives alternated between the two, depending on the economic strength
of the case for the new venture. If the economic case for the new venture was strong,
but some family members raised questions about the value to the family, family
members and family executives drew heavily on firm logic to make their case for
moving forward. On the other hand, if the economic rationale for the new venture was
weak, family members and family executives tended to use family logic to legitimize
the new venture.
Arguing for a new venture in spite of weak economic rationale tended to occur when
the family employed other logics to assess the merits of the new venture. Our research
pointed to three areas where this was likely to occur. First, family members evaluated
the new venture not only on the basis of market risk and wealth generating potential,
but also as contributing (or potentially damaging) family reputation in the community.
Research suggests that firms see reputation as primarily an asset with market and
financial implications (Boyd, Bergh, & Ketchen, 2010; Deephouse & Jaskiewicz,
2013). The Indian families that we studied saw reputation more broadly as having
impact on the social and political standing of the family with significant impact on the
family’s ability to forge alliances and influence the external environment. Tensions
between family and firm logics emerged when family assessment of new venture
reputational advantages or disadvantages influenced decision making. This tended to
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happen not only early on during the screening of the new venture ideas, but also later
when new ventures ran into difficulties. In these circumstances, families were often
influenced by the reputational damage to their standing in the community that may arise
if the new venture is shut down. For instance, when a new venture set-up by Motilal &
Sons experienced difficulties during its first year, the family decided to inject resources
by selling jointly held family land holdings in order to preserve the family reputation.
New venture evaluation and inter-family dynamics
Our research also showed that the evaluation of new ventures was also influenced by
intra-family dynamics. As an institution, internal dynamics in Indian family are shaped
by two strong imperatives: The first is the deference that the young must show
towards their elders, and second the overriding importance of maintaining inter-
generational family cohesion. These two imperatives increasingly come into
conflict as the family firm expands beyond founder controlled, to sibling
partnership, and later into cousin-consortium.
Intra-family dynamics in founder controlled family firms illustrate how Indian
family firms balance these two imperatives. In principle, founders in Indian family
firms have unlimited discretion. They can, and do, pursue new venture opportunities
based on their personal preferences knowing that the rest of the family must show
deference to their decisions. But making arbitrary decisions, and relying on deference
alone, risks undermining the cohesion of the family since it conflicts with shared
understanding of rights and obligations within the family as institution: The founder
may have the right to demand obedience, but he (all the founders in our sample were
men) is also obliged to explain how a decision protects and strengthens the family. In
our study we observed a number of instances where founders went beyond the
economic case to highlight how the new venture will benefit the family more generally.
Consider the case of Intellect, a family firm founded by Kumar Naidu as a
technology services company that focuses on serving engineering clients. While
Kumar’s brother and nephews got involved in business very early on, Kumar’s
only son, Vijay decided to start his career in the US working for a global
technology firm after graduating from Wharton. When Kumar detected a new
venture opportunity—developing a geographical information system to track
generation and distribution of electricity in the Indian market—in which Vijay
showed interest, he moved quickly to use this as an opening to bring Vijay into
the family business. But rather than schedule a formal meeting with family
members to discuss his idea, he broached the subject during one of the family
dinners that regularly brings the extended family together. The proposal was
sympathetically received by the extended family who in turn asked Kumar to
give Vijay the mandate to take the venture idea to next level.
In our data many new venture ideas originated from young family members. In
principle, young family members should be at a disadvantage when it comes to
proposing new venture ideas in a family system where deference to seniors is paramount.
In practice, we found that senior family members were willing to legitimize new venture
ideas that were championed by young family members on the grounds that rejection of
such ideas would lead to their alienation, and hence represent erosion of family
cohesion. The family legitimation was particularly striking when the proposed new
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venture had little to do with core business. A comment by Samir Lohia (2nd generation),
from Lohia Sons, a cousin consortium family firm, captured this dilemma well:
The 3rd or the 4th generation entering the family business is less interested in
expanding the core business. Maybe they have studied abroad and consider the
food business boring, or maybe they feel that they will be dominated by the elder
generation. In fact, there was a point last year, where we sat together with the 3rd
generation family members, and told them that the new venture ideas they have
been looking at are not only outside our mainstream businesses, but they are also
going to give far lesser return. But it doesn’t gel with the new generation. Despite
the financial incentive being there, they seek opportunities in biopharma or
international retail to seek independence, and maybe to prove to us that they
can make it on their own.
The need to maintain inter-generational family cohesion meant that new venture
ideas were discussed seriously even when they did not meet the standard criteria of
relatedness to mainstream business and rate of return. Given their youth and relative
inexperience, young family members should have been at a disadvantage when arguing
for a venture that did not fit with the core business. But they compensated for this
disadvantage by implicitly or explicitly relying on their role in maintaining family
cohesion. Appealing to family logic they therefore legitimized the use of venture
criteria that are not as a rule included in the decision process. This often meant that
criteria such as relatedness to mainstream business and rate of return that were
customarily used to evaluate new venture ideas when they are proposed by managers,
were altered to favor new venture ideas proposed by family members.
Krishnan Rao, Chairman of Rao Corp reflected on the vital role that he as the family
patriarch played in accommodating the interests of younger family members while
seeking to maintain family cohesion:
When my nephew Srini (fifth generation) completed his technology degree in
US, he, like his other cousins had the option to join one of the business units in an
executive role. Srini, however, was keen to start a new technology venture. He
approached his father who in turn suggested he first discuss this with his
grandfather- Senior Rao. Senior Rao suggested Srini to make a start by locating
the venture within an existing business unit. Until late last year, Srini however
struggled to secure resources to broaden the scope of his venture, which had little
synergy within the core business. Obviously this was really frustrating for him.
He regularly talks to Senior Rao, who keeps a close eye on family. Earlier this
year when the whole family was together for the annual get together, Senior Rao
called all of us in his room and made it clear to us that he endorsed Srini’s
initiative and even wrote a substantial cheque as a start-up capital. Following this,
other family members have come forward to provide seed capital and Srini’s
venture is taking off with the family’s blessings.
Relaxing the criteria that govern new venture screening and funding when decisions
are made within firm logic to accommodate the wishes and ambitions of younger
family members can potentially politicize the new venture creation process. This in turn
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may have adverse impact on family cohesion if other members of the family
feel that key family interests, specifically economic wealth, are being jeopar-
dized. In the family firms we observed, there were consultation processes in
place that allowed for open discussion of new venture ideas, even when in
principle senior family members had the final say. When consensus could not
be achieved, senior family members initiated more formal family proceedings to
resolve potential tensions. Shiv Lohia, the family patriarch and founder of
Lohia Sons, describes the process in the following way:
…once every working family member has received [the new venture] document,
a date and time are fixed for an informal discussion. Prior to this meeting, family
members with technical and financial competence do their evaluation and there is
a discussion on every aspect of the project. For instance, two members of the
second generation have in-depth knowledge of family wealth and how much risk
the family can take with new investments. There may be series of meetings but as
a general rule there are never more than three, and the outcome must be based on
100% family agreement. For instance, if the house is divided, we never go by
majority. The venture only receives a green light if it has 100% approval,
otherwise the project will be put on the hold.
To sum up, our interviews with family members point to key criteria as
playing a crucial role in the evaluation of new venture opportunities: (1)
economic value of the new venture opportunity, or more specifically the impact
of the new venture on family wealth, played a role; (2) maintaining family
cohesion by legitimizing discussion of new venture opportunities that are not
within the scope of mainstream business; (3) the potential value of new
ventures to upgrade the business skills of younger family members, in effect,
preparing them for senior positions down the line; and finally (4) the use of
new venture opportunities to project family’s reputation in the community, an
important aspect of the family as an institution in Indian society. Seen from the
perspective of inter-institutional logics these four can be summarized in the
following seven propositions.
Proposition 1 Family members that champion new ventures are more likely to em-
phasize family logic in their proposal if the new venture is difficult to justify using
economic logic.
Proposition 2 A new venture that is difficult to justify using economic logic will often
get the go head if it can be shown to generate substantial reputational benefits for the
family.
Proposition 3 A new venture that is difficult to justify using economic logic will often
get the go head if evaluation using attachment logic suggests that the new venture will
strongly contribute to present and future family cohesion.
Proposition 4 A new venture that has strong economic case but may potentially
damage the family reputation logic is likely to not receive the go ahead.
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Proposition 5 A new venture that has strong economic case but may potentially cause
divisions within the family is likely to not receive the go ahead.
Proposition 6 Proposed new venture opportunities that are outside the core family
business are more likely to be allocated resources if evaluation using expertise logic
suggests that they will add substantially to family expertise.
Proposition 7 Proposed new venture opportunities that are outside the core family
business, but are championed by young family members, are more likely to be allocated
resources if evaluation using attachment logic suggests that they will encourage these
family members to remain with the family.
Discussion
Contributions
Our research points out that in the case of Indian family firms (all firms were publicly
listed), resource allocation to new venture initiatives is deeply influenced by the family
aiming to uphold its family logic. Our findings from new venture creation process
presented above show interaction of four sub-logics operating within the family logic
(see Fig. 1). These are:
Family Economic Logic – The market and financial rationale for strategic
decisions must be consistent not only with the strategic position of the
firm, but also with the wealth they can generate for the family. When it
comes to recruiting resources and obtaining support, Indian families in our
sample were more likely to pay attention to decisions that can substantially
impact their wealth; responding positively if the decisions in question are
shown to increase family wealth, and negatively when they do not. In all
eight cases, capitalizing on new venture opportunities emerging in a grow-
ing Indian economy was regarded as vital to increasing family wealth for
current and future generations. As a result, in most cases, families were
open to evaluating new venture opportunities framed by family members
outside the core family business.
Family Expertise Logic – Firms invest in expertise in order to maintain and
improve their strategic position. Our data shows that Indian families (all eight
cases), were also intensely interested in investing in expertise of family members
as part of a long-term effort to enrich the family’s human capital. The logic of the
family and the firm therefore comes together when decisions that enrich expertise
have positive significance for the family and the firm. In particular, in sibling
partnership and cousin consortium family firms such as Rao Corp or Lohia Sons,
senior family members were acutely aware of the need to nurture family expertise
and displayed willingness to compromise on economic logic if family expertise
was augmented by the proposed NVopportunities.
Family Reputation Logic – Research suggests that firms see reputation as primarily
an asset with market and financial implications (Boyd et al., 2010). Indian families
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in our study, by contrast, saw reputation more broadly as having impact on the social
and political standing of the family with significant impact on the family’s ability to
forge alliances and influence the external environment. Family and firm logic
therefore came together when decisions that have an impact on reputation concerned
not only business consideration, but also the social and political standing of the
family. For instance, when a new venture set-up by Motilal & Sons experienced
difficulties during its first year, the family decided to inject resources by selling
jointly held family land holdings in order to preserve the family reputation.
Family Attachment Logic – Firms are usually concerned with psychologically and
socially binding employees to the organization (Hekman, Bigley, Steensma, &
Hereford, 2009). Researchers have established that as family firms evolve from
being founder-controlled to sibling partnership to cousin consortium, the pressure
to manage ties with an eye to the future multiplies (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino,
2003). To counteract ownership fragmentation and go-it-alone opportunism,
Indian families in our study reinforced the inter-institutional system that binds
the family to the firm. Our data showed that family members reinforced ties by
encouraging family celebrations and family get-togethers. The same logic holds
when strategic decisions that involve family members arise. Strategic decisions
were evaluated according to whether they will increase or decrease family mem-
bers’ ties to the organization. In particular sibling and cousin-consortium family
firms such as Lohia Sons were committed to keeping the family together, and
looked towards both family governance practices and informal family forums held
on sidelines of family get-togethers to preserve affiliation and discuss the impli-
cations new venture opportunities could have for family logic.
Attachment 
logic
Reputational logic
Economic logic
Expertise logic
Venture     
1
Venture 2
Fig. 1 New venture creation and EERA logic in family firm
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Figure one illustrates the proposed interaction between these four sub-logics when
two hypothetical venture opportunities with similar economic logic were under review.
For purposes of comparison we show two ventures V1 and V2. Economic logic results
in similar evaluation of the case for each venture, but they differ in evaluation when it
comes to the other three logics. Looking at the area enclosed by V1 and V2, one can see
that the area demarcated by V2 is much larger than V1. If the area stood for probability
of obtaining a go ahead for the new venture, then comparatively speaking we would
expect a much higher probability that V2 will obtain the go head than V1.
Figure 1 is useful as a starting point for evaluating the relative strength of the case
for a new venture when each of the four logics is used separately. The figure, however,
is static; it does not take into account the dynamic interaction among the logics. Our
analysis of the data, however, suggests that the four logics may be in opposition or may
reinforce each other during new venture creation. Furthermore, the interaction among
the four logics often depends on variety of factors that are contingent on the new
venture project. For example, opposition between economic logic and attachment logic
is more likely to arise if the new venture being championed is not related to the core
business. Similarly, stronger complementarity will arise between attachment and ex-
pertise logic when new venture opportunity is championed by young family member
who has spent time obtaining advanced business education. To sum up, our research
shows that family firms operate as an inter-institutional system, where strategic deci-
sion making and new venture resource allocation process is influenced by family
EERA logic. A summary of new ventures, the relatedness with core business units,
the impact on the family EERA logic as perceived by the top family executives, and the
process adapted for resource allocation for each new venture is provided in Table 3.
Limitations and future research
Our research carries a number of limitations. To begin with, as with all case studies and
convenience sampling, it is not possible to generalize our findings to the whole
population with the degree of confidence that we obtain from large samples (Yin,
2009). Second, the sample has a success bias since it is dominated by new ventures that
were formally recognized by the organization as potential ventures, leaving out new
venture ideas that may have been discussed informally but never made it to the
screening stage. A third limitation is a respondent bias that arises when information
is obtained only from individuals who agreed to participate in the research. Taken
together, these biases prevent us from observing the full range of values on outcome
variables; however, the methodology is suitable for our purpose of examining the logic
for new venture creation within family firms.
Going forward, our study suggests a number of directions for future research. To begin
with our study suggests that in family firms new venture opportunities are evaluated
using an inter-institutional logic, which includes an assessment of family economic,
expertise, reputation and attachment factors. These four logics interact to produce a go/
no-go decision for the new venture proposals and have implications for resource alloca-
tion decision before and after the new venture implementation. Second, the question
posed by our findings is the degree to which the strength of one logic makes up for the
weakness of the other. For instance, a new venture proposal, which has a relatively
weak economic case, may get a go-ahead because it delivers on the family reputation
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Table 3 New venture process and influence of family EERA for each new venture
Family firm and the NVs Source
of NV idea
Relatedness to
the core business
Perceived importance of
upholding family logic
Venture selection process and
the influence of family EERA
Resource
allocation
decisionFamily meetings
Shri Science
1. New drug unit NF High Low BI talk to Dr. AK (senior executive and related to
family) and then I sound it out with Bharat (son).
I rely on him because he is very clued in. He
respects Dr. AK too.^
Yes
2. Clinical research venture NF Low Low Yes
3. Drugs packaging business F-Brother Low Low Yes
4. Biotech venture F-Son Low High Yes
5. European venture F-Founder High Low Under review
Gene Tech
1. Clinical research organization F-2nd Gen Low High Formal process followed but family makes key
decisions.
BWe follow formal process for vetting opportunities
proposed by managers. We don’t interfere with
the process. We usually talk every evening.
Ultimately the decision rests with us.^
Yes
2. Korea venture NF High Low Under review
Intellect
1. Aircraft engineering JV F-Founder High Low Founder active in spotting opportunities; Consultations
with son and family meeting play vital role in
screening which opportunity to explore further.
BVijay (son) said why don’t we create the same
structure we did with the GIS domestic business.
We give Amit (member of extended family) some
percentage to make him feel he is really part of
our family.^
Yes
2. Geospatial India unit F-Founder High Low Yes
3. GIS to Global customers JV F-Founder High Low Yes
4. Retail services application F-Son High Low Under Review
Kohnioor Enterprises
1. Auto oils Middle East venture F-2nd Gen High Low Founder and family play vital role in screening
venture opportunities.
Yes
2. Electrical auto pumps unit F-Founder High Low Yes
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Table 3 (continued)
Family firm and the NVs Source
of NV idea
Relatedness to
the core business
Perceived importance of
upholding family logic
Venture selection process and
the influence of family EERA
Resource
allocation
decisionFamily meetings
BI have to respect the elders and keep the personal
interest at bay to uphold our family tradition of
respecting elders. Dad has the final say. He said
we cannot let the personal interest interfere with
the family interest. We got to move together. Now
I have three novel business ideas, all of which
have tremendous potential.^ (Next generation
family member commenting upon rejection of
venture idea)
3. GPS car navigation system F-2nd Gen Low Low Under review
4. Manufacturing auto parts F-2nd Gen Low High No
Links Limited
1. Shipping port F-Founder High Low Family consisting of founder and his two sons
screen venture opportunities and meet most
days of the week for dinner to review business
and discuss potential opportunities.
BAs a family we meet very frequently. We are also
guided by the family board which meets twice a
year to take decisions in the interest of family
members. We do not invest in NVs, which do not
meet the family’s ROI threshold. The executive
board has never dismissed the interest of family
or the decision proposed by the family.^
BI am looking for NV opportunities in Australia
related to iron ore and the family is 100%
behind me. We will make a case and I do not
think board will have a problem.^
Yes
2. Coal and iron ore mining venture F-2nd Gen High Low Yes
Motilal & Sons
1. Real estate venture F-3rd Gen Low High Yes
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Table 3 (continued)
Family firm and the NVs Source
of NV idea
Relatedness to
the core business
Perceived importance of
upholding family logic
Venture selection process and
the influence of family EERA
Resource
allocation
decisionFamily meetings
Family screens venture opportunities and decides
collectively which one will be allocated resources.
BOur family follows the policy laid by my great
grandfather that one person looks after one
business and of course we have started NVs
to adhere to that policy. We don’t have written
rules but aim for consensus.^
BThe emotional bonding within the family is very
strong. Our family has been through lot of
emotional ups and downs when my eldest uncle
started his independent enterprise in the mid 1980s.^
2. International trading venture F-3rd Gen High Low Yes
3. Financial services venture F-3rd Gen Low Low Yes
Lohia Sons
1. Biotechnology venture F-4th Gen Low Low Family has clear process in place to balance the
family EERA logic. In case member of 3rd
generation spots the opportunity, he needs to
gain endorsement from member of 2nd generation.
Every venture opportunity is then presented and
discussed at Family Meeting which is held
regularly or is called on need basis.
BThe rules are desirable. Though they are followed
mostly, but there are some family members who
see this them as superfluous.^
BThe venture only receives a green light if it has
100% approval, otherwise the project will be
put on the hold. If there is an opinion making,
father has the final say, and everybody falls in line.^
Yes
2. Biomass power plant F-3rd Gen Low Low Yes
3. Retail chain in Australia F-3rd Gen Low Low Yes
4. Packaged food for Indian retail F- 3rd Gen High High No
5. Food processing business in Ghana F-2nd Gen High High Yes-Resubmit
6. Real estate business in Tamil Nadu F-3rd Gen Low Low Yes
7. Shipping terminals venture F-2nd Gen Low Moderate Yes
8. Clothing business in China F-3rd Gen Low Low Yes
9. Solvent fractionation venture F-2nd Gen High Low Yes
10. Oil pump manufacturing F-3rd Gen Low Low Yes
11. Agro business in South America F-2nd Gen Low Moderate Yes
Rao Corp
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Table 3 (continued)
Family firm and the NVs Source
of NV idea
Relatedness to
the core business
Perceived importance of
upholding family logic
Venture selection process and
the influence of family EERA
Resource
allocation
decisionFamily meetings
1. Spirulina algae manufacturing venture F- 4th Gen Low Moderate BUncle commissioned research on Spirulina. It
did not fit in our businesses. Since the outlay
was low, the family said OK.^
Yes-staged
2. Rural retail venture NF Low Low BWe are trying to put in flexible rules to encourage
family members to start NVs.^
Yes
3. New venture on ceramic colors NF High Low Yes
4. Information services venture F-5th Gen Low Moderate Yes
5. Water conservation products NF Low Low Under review
6. Living spaces NF Low Low Under review
F Family, NF Non-Family, Gen Generation, JVs Joint ventures, NVs New ventures
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and expertise dimensions. Research on this process could address the question of how
this evaluation takes place: Do family firms consider all four EERA sub-logics simulta-
neously or sequentially? Do they weigh them separately or relative to each other?
Future research could also examine the new venture selection and EERA
interaction from an attention-based view perspective (Ocasio, 1997). In partic-
ular, we need to know more on the processes that lead key family decision
makers in founder-controlled versus sibling partnership or cousin-consortium
family firms to allocate substantial attention and resources to some new venture
proposals at the expense of others. More specifically, to what extent do sub-
logics influence the attention that new venture ideas receive in cousin-
consortium versus sibling partnership? By the same token, will new venture
ideas receive more systematic evaluation if they are high on certain sub-logics
than others?
Researchers could also examine how EERA logic influences other strategic decisions
such as family’s propensity to pursue mergers and acquisitions, or to devote resources to
innovation. For instance, recent research by Liu, Chen, and Wang (2016) showed that
firms with higher level of family ownership have significantly lower internal innovation
in terms of R&D investment. Future studies could examine: How EERA logics influ-
ences strategic decisions such as R&D investments in family firms at different life
stages (i.e., founder-controlled, sibling partnership and cousin-consortium)?
Conclusions
Challenging the prevailing agency view of family firms, Miller et al. (2011) and Miller,
Le Breton-Miller, and Lester (2013) argued that institutional logics represent a prom-
ising alternative to agency theory explanations of strategy in family firms. The work of
these authors, as is the case in most family firms research, concentrates on the dynamics
of family firms in advanced Western industrial countries.
In Western countries, a key problem facing family firms that rely on capital markets
is the tension that arises between preservation of socioemotional wealth (Deephouse &
Jaskiewicz, 2013; Labaki et al., 2013; Leitterstorf & Rau, 2014; Rau, 2013), and the
institutional logic that institutions such as stock markets and independent investors
subscribe to (Miller et al., 2013). Because moves that preserve socioemotional wealth
often invites criticism from actors that follow the institutional logic of capital markets,
family firms will seek greater legitimacy by exercising greater financial prudence and
by conforming more closely to business standards in their sector. In principle, at least,
such conformity should impact the long-term financial performance of the family firm,
and may contribute to the transition to professionally managed organization that is the
life cycle of so many family firms in advanced Western economies.
Our study builds on the work of Miller et al. (2011, 2013) in as much as we also
adopt an institutional approach to the strategic behavior of family firms. Our study,
however, differs from this research in a number of significant areas.
First, our study examines family firms in traditional societies where the family as an
institution carries strong legitimacy not only within the firm, but also in the wider
society. Thus, while preservation of socioemotional wealth may be as important to
Indian family firms, as would be the case for American or French firms, decisions that
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enhance this wealth will attract far less hostility from external actors in the Indian
context than would be the case for family firms in the United States or Europe. In
effect, the legitimacy that the family carries in traditional societies means that it can
justify decisions that serve family interests more easily than is the case in advanced
Western economies where family interests are viewed as private matters that should not
influence the financial and strategic conduct of the firm. With less criticism to contend
with, family firms in traditional societies have greater flexibility when it comes to
balancing the tensions that may arise between family and firm institutional logics than
is the case in advanced Western economies.
The second area where our study differs from previous family firms research that
takes an institutional perspective is our analysis of institutional logics that govern
strategic decision making. Miller et al. (2011, 2013) emphasized the preservation of
socioemotional wealth as an institutional logic that operates alongside institutional
logics that are embedded in capital markets. Our study looks at family firm governance
from the perspective of multiple institutional logics that manage the tension between
family and firm. In effect, we see the tension between family and firm logics from an
internal perspective, rather than as a problem of balancing internal family interests with
external public scrutiny. This leads us to distinguish between four sub-logics that
regulate the strategy process in family firms: Economic institutional sub-logic that sets
evaluative market and financial criteria, expertise sub-logic that evaluates the extent to
which strategic decisions enrich family human capital, reputation sub-logic that exam-
ines the reputational impact of strategic decisions on the family standing in the
community, and attachment sub-logic which evaluates the impact of strategic initiatives
on inter-generational cohesion.
Mapping the institutional logics of family firms is an important step towards
understanding how the family firm operates as an inter-institutional system. This is of
interest not only for researchers, but also for family firm decision makers. To begin
with, the influence of institutional logics is a function of socialization and enculturation
of family members to each other, and to the family as an institution that occupies an
important role in society. The process is to some extent tacit, but must be explicitly
recognized and reinforced if it is to exercise enduring influence over decision making.
Second, the relationship among the institutional logics we outline in this paper is
dynamic: At any point in time some institutional logics are more likely to exercise
greater influence than others. Of considerable concern to family firm decision makers is
the risk that short-term emphasis on some institutional logics will lead to the gradual
suppression of other institutional logics; which may in some cases result in breakdown
in the relationship between family and non-family managers, while in other cases may
undermine the long-term survival of the family as a cohesive unit. To counteract this
risk, family decision makers should not only regularly affirm the intrinsic importance of
each of the institutional logics, they should also be alert to the consequences of placing
excessive emphasis on some institutional logics at the expense of others.
Acknowledgements We would like to thank Senior Editor Anil Nair and two anonymous reviews for their
helpful comments and suggestions throughout the review process. We are also grateful to Patricia Thornton,
William Ocasio, Naga Lakshmi Damaraju and Dishan Kamdar for their useful suggestions and comments.
Ajay Bhalla acknowledges the support of Thomas Schmidheiny Centre for Family Enterprise for data
collection during his stay as visiting scholar at Indian School of Business. This paper also benefited from
Lampel J. et al.
the constructive feedback of audiences at the 2010 Strategic Management Society Conference, 2012 Academy
of Management Conference, and the 2013 EGOS conference.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Ahlstrom, D., Young, M. N., Nair, A., & Law, P. 2003. Managing the institutional environment: Challenges
for foreign firms in post WTO China. SAM Advanced Management Journal, 68(2): 41–49.
Aldrich, H. 2000. Organizations evolving. London: Sage.
Alesina, A., & Giuliano, P. 2015. Culture and institutions. Journal of Economic Literature, 53(4): 898–944.
Alvarez, S. A., & Barney, J. B. 2010. Entrepreneurship and epistemology: The philosophical underpinnings of
the study of entrepreneurial opportunities. Academy of Management Annals, 4(1): 557–583.
Bartel, C. A., & Garud, R. 2009. The role of narratives in sustaining organizational innovation. Organization
Science, 20(1): 107–117.
Battilana, J., & Dorado, S. 2010. Organization building amid multiple institutional logics: The case of
commercial microfinance organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 53(6): 1419–1440.
Biggart, N. W., & Guillen, M. F. 1999. Developing difference: Social organization and the rise of the auto
industries of South Korea, Taiwan, Spain, and Argentina. American Sociological Review, 64(5): 722–747.
Boje, D. M. 1991. The storytelling organization: A study of storytelling performance in an office supply firm.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(1): 106–126.
Boland, R. J., Lyytinen, K. J., & Yoo, Y. 2007. Wakes of innovation in project networks: The case of digital 3-
D representations in architecture, engineering, and construction. Organization Science, 18(4): 631–647.
Boyd, B. K., Bergh, D. D., & Ketchen Jr., D. J. 2010. Reconsidering the reputation-performance relationship:
A resource-based view. Journal of Management, 36(3): 588–609.
Burawoy, M. (Ed.). 1991. Ethnography unbound: Power and resistance in the modern metropolis. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Burgelman, R. A. 2002. Strategy as vector and the inertia of co-evolutionary lock. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 72: 325–357.
Carney, M., Gedajlovic, E., & Yang, X. 2009. Varieties of Asian capitalism: Toward an institutional theory of
Asian enterprise. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26(3): 361–380.
Cruz, A. D., Howorth, C., & Hamilton, E. 2013. Intrafamily entrepreneurship: The formation and membership
of family entrepreneurial teams. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 37(1): 17–46.
Danneels, E. 2007. The process of technology competence leveraging. Strategic Management Journal, 28(5):
511–533.
Deephouse, D. L., & Jaskiewicz, P. 2013. Do family firms have better reputations than non-family firms? An
integration of socioemotional wealth and social identity theories. Journal of Management Studies, 50(3):
337–360.
Delmestri, G., & Walgenbach, P. 2009. Interference among institutional influences and technical economic
conditions: The adoption of the assessment Center in French, German, Italian, UK and US international
firms. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 20(4): 885–911.
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management Review, 14(4):
488–511.
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. 2007. Theory building from cases: Opportunities and challenges.
Academy of Management Journal, 50(1): 25–32.
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Santos, F. M. 2009. Constructing markets and shaping boundaries: Entrepreneurial
power in nascent fields. Academy of Management Journal, 52(4): 643–671.
Franks, J., Mayer, C., & Rossi, S. 2005. Spending less time with the family: The decline of family ownership
in the United Kingdom. In R. K. Morck (Ed.). A history of corporate governance around the world:
Family business groups to professional managers: 581–612. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Friedland, R., & Alford, R. R. 1991. Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices, and institutional contra-
dictions. In W. W. Powell, & P. J. DiMaggio (Eds.). The new institutionalism in organizational analysis:
232–263. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Family values and inter-institutional...
Glick, W. H., Huber, G. P., Miller, C. C., Doty, H. D., & Sutcliffe, K. M. 1990. Studying changes in
organization design and effectiveness: Retrospective event histories and periodic assessments.
Organization Science, 1(3): 293–312.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Makri, M., & Kintana, M. L. 2010. Diversification decisions in family-controlled firms.
Journal of Management Studies, 47(2): 223–252.
Greenwood, R., Diaz, A. M., Xiao Li, S., & Lorente, J. C. 2010. The multiplicity of institutional logics and the
heterogeneity of organizational responses. Organization Science, 21(2): 521–539.
Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (Eds.) 2001. The varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundation of comparative
advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harris, S., & Sutton, R. I. 1986. Functions of parting ceremonies in dying organizations. Academy of
Management Journal, 29(1): 5–30.
Haveman, H. A., Rao, H., & Paruchuri, S. 2007. The winds of change: The progressive movement and the
bureaucratization of thrift. American Sociological Review, 72(1): 114–142.
Hekman, D., Bigley, G., Steensma, K. H., & Hereford, J. F. 2009. Combined effect of organizational and
professional identification on the reciprocity dynamic for professional employees. Academy of
Management Journal, 52(3): 506–526.
Hitt, M. A., Li, D., & Xu, K. 2016. International strategy: From local to global and beyond. Journal of World
Business, 51(1): 58–73.
Hodgson, G. 2006. What is an institution. Journal of Economic Issues, 40(1): 1–25.
Ingram, P., & Lifschitz, A. 2006. Kinship in the shadow of the corporation: The interbuilder network in Clyde
River shipbuilding, 1711–1990. American Sociological Review, 71(2): 334–352.
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. 2000. Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysis of diversified
Indian business groups. Journal of Finance, 55(2): 867–891.
Kirzner, I. 1973. Competition and entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kostova, T., & Roth, K. 2002. Adoption of an organizational practice by the subsidiaries of the MNC:
Institutional and relational effects. Academy of Management Journal, 45: 215–233.
Labaki, R., Michael-Tsabari, N., & Zachary, R. K. 2013. Exploring the emotional nexus in cogent family
business archetypes: Towards business models inclusive of the emotional dimension. Entrepreneurship
Research Journal, 3(3): 301–330.
Le Breton-Miller, I., & Miller, D. 2013. Socioemotional wealth across the family firm life cycle: A
commentary on ‘family business survival and the role of boards’. Entrepreneurship: Theory and
Practice, 37(6): 1391–1397.
Leaptrott, J. 2005. An institutional theory view of the family business. Family Business Review, 18(3): 215–
228.
Lee, T. W., Mitchell, T. R., & Sablynski, C. J. 1999. Qualitative research in organizational and vocational
psychology 1979–1999. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 55(2): 161–187.
Leitterstorf, M. P., & Rau, S. B. 2014. Socioemotional wealth and IPO underpricing of family firms. Strategic
Management Journal, 35(5): 751–760.
Liu, Y., Ahlstrom, D., & Yeh, K. S. 2006. The separation of ownership and management in Taiwan’s public
companies: An empirical study. International Business Review, 15(4): 415–435.
Liu, Y., Chen, Y.-J., & Wang, L. C. 2016. Family business, innovation and organizational slack in Taiwan.
Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 34(1): 193–213.
Lopez, J., & Scott, J. 2000. Social structure. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Lounsbury, M. 2007. A tale of two cities: Competing logics and practice variation in the professionalizing of
mutual funds. Academy of Management Journal, 50(2): 289–307.
McDonald, M., Khanna, P., & Westphal, J. D. 2008. Getting them to think outside the circle: Corporate
governance, CEO advice networks, and firm performance. Academy of Management Journal, 51(3): 453–
475.
Mehrotra, V., Morck, R., Shim, J., & Wiwattanakantang, Y. 2011. Must love kill the family firm? Some
exploratory evidence. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 35(6): 1121–1148.
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., & Lester, R. H. 2011. Family and lone founder ownership and strategic
behavior: Social context, identity, and institutional logics. Journal of Management Studies, 48(1): 1–24.
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., & Lester, R. H. 2013. Family firm governance, strategic conformity, and
performance: Institutional vs. strategic perspectives. Organization Science, 24(1): 189–209.
Mustakallio, M., Autio, E., & Zahra, S. A. 2002. Relational and contractual governance in family firms:
Effects on strategic decisions making. Family Business Review, 15(3): 205–222.
Ocasio, W. 1997. Towards an attention-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 18: 187–206.
Pache, A. P., & Santos, F. 2013. Inside the hybrid organization: Selective coupling as a response to competing
institutional logics. Academy of Management Journal, 56(4): 972–1001.
Lampel J. et al.
Rau, S. B. 2013. Emotions preventing survival of family firms: Comments on exploring the emotional nexus
in cogent family business archetypes: Towards a predominant business model inclusive of the emotional
dimension. Entrepreneurship Research Journal, 3(3): 425–432.
Reay, T., Jaskiewicz, P., & Hinings, C. R. 2015. How family, business and community logics shape family firm
behavior and Brules of the game^ in an organizational field. Family Business Review, 28(4): 292–311.
Santos, F. M., & Eisenhardt, K. M. 2009. Constructing markets and shaping boundaries: Entrepreneurial
power in nascent fields. Academy of Management Journal, 52(4): 643–671.
Schjoedt, L., Monsen, E., Pearson, A., Barnett, T., & Chrisman, J. J. 2013. New venture and family business
teams: Understanding team formation, composition, behaviors, and performance. Entrepreneurship:
Theory and Practice, 37(1): 1–15.
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. 2003. Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms.
Journal of Business Venturing, 18(4): 473–490.
Scott, W. R. 2014. Institutions and organizations: Ideas, interests, and identities, 4th ed. Los Angeles: Sage.
Sharma, P., & Manikutty, S. 2005. Strategic divestments in family firms: Role of family structure and
community culture. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 29(3): 293–311.
Siggelkow, N. 2007. Persuasion with case studies. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1): 20–24.
Sillars, A. L. 1995. Communication and family culture. In M. A. Fitzpatrick, & A. L. Vangelisti (Eds.).
Explaining family interactions: 375–399. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Steier, L. P., Chua, J. H., & Chrisman, J. J. 2009. Embeddedness perspectives of economic action within
family firms. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 33(6): 1157–1167.
Thornton, P. H. 2004. Markets from culture: Institutional logics and organizational decisions in higher
education publishing. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. 1999. Institutional logics and the historical contingency of power in
organizations: Executive succession in the higher education publishing industry, 1958–1990. American
Journal of Sociology, 105(3): 801–843.
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. 2008. Institutional logics. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby
(Eds.). Handbook of organizational institutionalism. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Thornton, P. H., Ocasio, W., & Lounsbury, M. 2012. Institution logics: Theory, methods and research. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Tilly, C. 2006.Why? What happens when people give reasons…and why. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Yin, R. K. 2009. Case study research: Design and methods, 4th ed. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Yoshikawa, T., & Rasheed, A. 2009. Convergence of corporate governance: Critical review and future
directions. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(3): 388–404.
Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. 1994. The costs and benefits of managerial incentives and monitoring in large
US corporations: When is more not better?. Strategic Management Journal, 15(S1): 121–142.
Zellweger, T. M., Nason, R. S., & Nordqvist, M. 2012. From longevity of firms to transgenerational
entrepreneurship of families: Introducing family entrepreneurial orientation. Family Business Review,
25(2): 136–155.
Zott, C., & Huy, Q. N. 2007. How entrepreneurs use symbolic management to acquire resources.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(1): 70–105.
Joseph Lampel (PhD McGill University) is Eddie Davis Chair of Enterprise and Innovation Management at
Alliance Manchester Business School, University of Manchester in the UK. He is the author with Henry
Mintzberg and Bruce Ahlstrand of one of the best selling strategy books: BStrategy Safari^, Free Press, and has
published in top journals such as the Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal,
Organization Science, Journal of Management, Academy of Management Perspectives, Journal of Manage-
ment Studies, and Sloan Management Review. His work has been funded by several institutions such as
NESTA, ESRC and EPSRC. He is the co-author of study of the economic performance of UK employee-
owned businesses, funded by John Lewis Partnership, and the UK Department for Business, Innovation, and
Skills. The study has been extensively used by the UK government to develop new policies for encouraging
employee ownership.
Ajay Bhalla (PhD, Nottingham Trent University) is Professor of Global Innovation and Family Business at
Cass Business School, City, University of London. He has specific research interest in how ownership and
governance structures influence innovation and strategic decision making. He has published in journals such
as the Academy of Management Perspectives, Journal of Operations Management, and Journal of World
Business. His work has been funded by several institutions such as NESTA and Institute for Family Business.
He is the co-author of study of the economic performance of UK employee-owned businesses, funded by John
Family values and inter-institutional...
Lewis Partnership, and the UK Department for Business, Innovation, and Skills. The study has been
extensively used by the UK government to develop new policies for encouraging employee ownership.
Kavil Ramachandran (PhD, Cranfield University) is Clinical Professor and Executive Director of the
Thomas Schmidheiny Centre for Family Enterprise at the Indian School of Business, Hyderabad. He
specializes in family business and has over 30 years of combined experience as an academic at the Indian
Institute of Management, Ahmedabad and the Indian School of Business. He is on the Board of several family
companies and advises family businesses in areas such as family business governance, professionalization,
succession planning, strategic planning, identification of new opportunities for growth, corporate entrepre-
neurship and turn around strategies in family and non-family environments. He has translated his insights into
family businesses in his recent book BThe 10 Commandments for Family Business^ published by Sage.
Lampel J. et al.
